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My opinions on the various issues that we have discussed since
yesterday are, of course, heavily colored by the experience of Indonesia
after the crisis. It is fair to say that we should be very cautious, because
some downside risk remains in the global economy and we cannot
discount the possibility of a new crisis emerging. And looking ahead,
prevention should remain at the center of our goals. I believe prevention
will have to be achieved through the strengthening of institutions and a
better idea of what future priorities should be, in particular for emerging
countries like Indonesia. And this strengthening must be done in the most
expeditious and comprehensive manner.
Let me start with a summary. I believe that in today’s environment
of globalized capital ﬂows, the maintenance of ﬁnancial stability should
be the shared responsibility of all parties. In light of this, I remain of the
opinion that all players in the international ﬁnancial market, both public
and private, should abide by certain rules and standards. For the public
sector, the beneﬁts of adhering to international rules and standards are
self-evident. But for the private sector, as I see it, the task of ensuring
non-destabilizing behavior still remains primarily with the public super-
visory bodies. I would also pose the question of how far market discipline
can really be relied upon without creating negative sentiment among
market participants.
Turning to the issue of the capital account, I do not think any of us
here would deny that emerging markets and developing economies have
beneﬁted from the trend toward the globalization of capital ﬂows. In
many countries, capital inﬂows have facilitated the efﬁcient utilization of
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long-term development of the economy. But I would stress that the ﬁrst
outcome that I have mentioned, the efﬁcient utilization of resources, has
not occurred in every country, only in some countries.
The recent crisis has exposed the danger of letting the beneﬁts of free
capital movements overshadow the dangers. In the case of Indonesia, for
example, we followed a disorderly sequencing in our liberalization
efforts. We started capital account liberalization in the 1970s, before the
liberalization of the current account, and it turned out that as time went
on, liberalization of the capital account was agreeable to the Indonesian
authorities, since it succeeded in ﬁlling the saving-investment gap and
widening the range of opportunities available to foreign investors.
However, the surge in capital inﬂows, in particular in the early 1990s,
occurred when Indonesia’s economic integration into the world market
was not supported by a well-developed institutional and regulatory
framework. We now think that if we could turn the clock back, we would
not have moved so swiftly; for example, we would not have removed the
ceiling on foreign commercial borrowing by banks in 1989, nor provided
a swap facility through Bank Indonesia until 1994-95, given the overall
weaknesses in the ﬁnancial system.
These weaknesses stemmed from inadequate regulation and super-
vision, a tradition of implicit and unwarranted government guarantees to
industry, and signiﬁcant governmental withdrawal from credit alloca-
tions for some investments that were genuinely important, for example,
investments in infrastructure and electricity. Most important were the
weaknesses in governance at a more general and fundamental level.
These problems were all reﬂected in the misallocation of credit and
inﬂated asset prices. So the ﬁrst beneﬁt of capital account liberalization
that I mentioned, the improvement in the utilization and allocation of
funds, has not occurred in Indonesia. Some international funds are not
being used efﬁciently, and we are going to have to end some projects.
Another typical fragility in Indonesia stemmed from large, un-
hedged liabilities in foreign currencies, accumulated by highly geared
private corporations. This buildup intersected with exchange rate devel-
opments. When our ﬁxed exchange rate regime in the 1970s turned into
managed ﬂoating in the late 1980s, we had another ﬁxed regime in reality.
Because the managed ﬂoats became guarantees by the government,
nobody thought that they should hedge any foreign debt exposures. This
led to corporations’ making very unsound decisions in their borrowing,
while lack of information also made it difﬁcult for lenders to assess the
riskiness of borrowers in Indonesia. So lack of economic and ﬁnancial
data for making good and informed decisions contributed to the inade-
quate capacity for risk management and the accumulation of dangerous
imbalances.
From this experience, I would say that poorly sequenced or poorly
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Indonesia. Excessive short-term debt and highly leveraged positions in
both the banking and the corporate sectors were the basic problem, not
the capital account liberalization itself. Before I describe our thinking
about this capital account issue, I would point out that on May 17, 1999,
Indonesia enacted a law governing the capital account and exchange rate
system. This new law states that we will adopt an open capital account
and embrace a free ﬂow of capital. From our own experience, we know
that for the open capital account to provide real long-term and sustain-
able beneﬁts to our country, we have to overcome all the issues that I
have just mentioned. Therefore, let me cite several things that we are
doing in order to reap the beneﬁts of what we believe to be the best choice
for Indonesia, an open and free ﬂow of capital.
First and foremost is the strengthening of the domestic ﬁnancial
system, and that includes the establishment of adequate laws and
regulations for foreign exchange transactions, to force this market to
develop properly. We also need appropriate reporting and disclosure
requirements and accounting and payment systems, to improve market
transparency and functioning. We must strengthen our prudential and
regulatory frameworks, as well as our capacities to identify, price,
measure, and manage international liquidity, credit, and foreign ex-
change risk. This means strengthening systems of risk management, not
only externally but also internally within the banks, and direct regulation
of risk exposure, by such means as limits on open positions and limits to
maturity mismatch, and so forth. We also believe that a system of
penalties for nonviable institutions, like closures, and the actual enforce-
ment of regulations could improve the efﬁciency with which we inter-
mediate the capital ﬂows that we view as the best option for Indonesia.
Moreover, while I would say that capital controls are not a long-term
solution, in a world where markets do not always function in an orderly
manner, second-best capital controls should be treated as one of the
necessary alternatives. But in the case of Indonesia, I do not think we have
the option to go back to closed capital markets.
Second, capital account liberalization needs also to be fully sup-
ported by a consistent macroeconomic framework, including a consistent
money and exchange rate policy. The new central bank law leaves Bank
Indonesia independent and focused solely on price stability, and that law
will make it easier to run our monetary policy, as we do not have to be
bogged down in choosing exchange rates and interest rates. Learning
from our experience, I believe that while huge short-term capital inﬂows
involve risks, nothing is wrong with short-term capital inﬂows per se. But
the other side of the coin is equally important; these ﬂows must occur
within a system of good public and private sector governance and all the
other institutional requirements I have mentioned.
I would like to add two other very important conclusions we have
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ﬂexible exchange rate system, with ﬂoating rates since August 14, 1997,
provides a built-in discipline in a market where all the other infrastruc-
tures are not sufﬁciently strong. This ﬂoat will in itself create a brake on
huge and unwise borrowing from overseas, because market participants
will have to weigh the cost of possible rupiah depreciation against that of
borrowing overseas, since our interest rates are still so much higher than
those abroad. Therefore we believe that, for the time being, despite the
importance of a stable exchange rate for the real sector, it is more
beneﬁcial for us to teach market participants the lesson that they have to
hedge, if they are going to choose to borrow abroad.
The last point concerns the international lender of last resort. Our
experience with the international lender of last resort was unique. When
our government ﬁnally decided to seek international help, led by the IMF,
it was with the understanding that the bailout would enable Indonesia to
regain a positive reception from market participants, and that we would
have adequate foreign exchange reserves despite the sudden reversal of
private capital inﬂows. However, the conditions imposed included
removal of subsidies to various enterprises and monopoly practices
(which resulted in huge public protests and, thus, no strong support from
the authorities), and the closure of 16 banks without any deposit
insurance in place. In addition, the so-called $43 billion package was
dispersed in small shares, with only a $4 billion initial disbursement.
These conditions and the modest ﬁnancial support have exacerbated
market skepticism that Indonesia can really overcome its problems. Of
course, I should not discount the fact that Indonesia has still another
problem, political uncertainty, but the fact that the bailout has not been
that efﬁcient in improving conﬁdence is quite signiﬁcant to Indonesia. In
fact, I tend to agree with Jeffrey Sachs, that the Frankfurt deal on
interbank debt restructuring was more important to restoring conﬁdence
in Indonesia than was the IMF rescue. And, therefore, apart from the fact
that the IMF cannot print money and does not have adequate resources,
I leave with the question of whether an international lender of last resort
can be very helpful.
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